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INCOMPLETE INVESTIGATION 
RESULTS IN ACQUITTAL 
R. v. Egresits, 2002 BCCA 163 
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linking his mother, his brother, or [the other male] to 
exclude them from the realm of reasonably possible 
perpetrators of the production offence. It may well be 
that a more thorough investigation would have uncovered 
sufficient evidence to exclude the others and to spin a 
sufficient web to permit the inference of the appellant's 
guilt, but that is to speculate. (emphasis added) 
V
Aenter in progress, police discovered 
a 21 plant marihuana grow operation 
in the basement of a home and 
consequently obtained a search 
arrant. Although the trial judge found that the police 
hould have done more to fully investigate the matter, 
e nevertheless found there existed a minimum amount 
f circumstantial evidence warranting a conviction. In 
ddition to the testimony from the accused’s mother 
hat he had keys to the house and sometimes stayed 
here, police found an undated envelope addressed to 
he accused and a transcript in the name of the 
ccused at the house. The accused appealed, arguing 
hat the evidence could not reasonably support the 
uilty verdict. 
n overturning the conviction and entering an acquittal, 
he British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA) held that 
he evidence against the accused was not any greater 
han evidence linking three other persons to the house.  
t was noted that the police also located documents 
ddressed to another male and a telephone bill in the 
ame of the accused’s brother. Furthermore, the 
ccused’s mother had a key to open the padlocked door 
o the basement area of the house and did in fact do so 
hen assisting the police in executing their warrant. 
he search warrant application included also 
nformation that it did not appear the house was being 
ived in at the time. In allowing the appeal, Huddart 
.A. for the unanimous Court stated at para. 8: 
The trial judge commented on the lack of a full 
investigation of this offence, but concluded that it would 
be pure speculation as to what such an investigation 
might have turned up. I do not agree with his implicit 
suggestion that it would be pure speculation to suggest 
someone else might have been responsible for the grow 
operation. While [the accused] might be the most likely 
perpetrator, the circumstantial evidence linking him to 
the grow operation is not sufficiently greater than that  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
RIGHT TO ENTER  
TO PROTECT INTERESTS OF 
OCCUPANTS: REASONABLE 
SUSPICION SUFFICIENT 
R. v. Kingbell, 2002 SKQB 69 
 
At about 3:20 am an unknown female 
olume 2 Issue 4 
pril 2002 flagged down two city police officers 
patrolling the area and turned in a 
purse found on a city street. After 
examining the contents of the purse and finding a 
driver’s licence with a name and address, police 
attended the address to return the purse to the 
owner. Police found lights on at the home and could see 
in through the window from the doorstep, noting a 
“disheveled” front room, contents strewn about, and a 
duffle bag on the floor. Police suspected a break in. 
One officer went to the back door and found it to be 
slightly ajar although there was no evidence to suggest 
it had been forced open. The officers informed their 
dispatcher that they were going to enter to check for 
a break and enter or to see if anyone was injured.  The 
officers went to the back door, announced their 
presence and after receiving no response, entered. 
 
Inside the officers found open cabinets and drawers, 
items strewn about, a number of tools gathered 
together in the kitchen, and a number of plants (some 
marihuana) growing in one of the bedrooms under 
fluorescent lights. The officers proceeded into the 
basement where they moved aside a partition and 
discovered a complete marihuana grow operation. The 
officers called their sergeant who attended and was 
shown the discovery. While the two officers waited at 
 and remained parked on the property to ensure its 
security, a search warrant was applied for and 
subsequently executed. 
 
The accused argued that the search and seizure was 
unreasonable and the evidence should be excluded 
under s.24(2) of the Charter. It was suggested that 
although a warrant was executed, the information 
relied upon to obtain the warrant was itself tainted by 
the entry and search of the premises by the officers. 
Furthermore, the sergeant’s entry into the premises to 
be shown the discovery further compounded the s.8 
violation. Finally, it was contended, the officers could 
not remain on the property to secure the premises 
while the search warrant was obtained. 
 
In summarizing the evidence, Smith J. of the 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench stated: 
 
[The officers] entered the residence…on the basis of a 
bona fide suspicion that a break and enter could have 
occurred, and a reasonable concern that the perpetrator 
or an injured innocent party might still be inside. … They 
did not enter for the purpose of seeking or obtaining 
evidence of a criminal act as against the persons who 
owned or resided in the property in question, but only for 
the purpose of protecting their property or safety. No 
one responded to their announcement of who they were 
on entry, and no one asked them not to enter. There is no 
evidence that they were aware of the presence of a 
marihuana grow operation on the premises or that they 
were looking for evidence to support the within charge. 
 
The Law 
 
Section 8 of the Charter is only triggered if the 
accused can establish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. If no such privacy interest can be established, 
s.8 is not violated and there is no need to consider the 
exclusionary mechanism under s.24(2) of the Charter. 
In this case, the Court applied the Ontario Court of 
Appeal judgment in R. v. Mulligan1 which recognizes an 
implied licence at law that permits a police officer 
acting on a “bona fide belief that gives rise to a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity being 
perpetrated against the owner or occupant or 
property” to enter onto the property where a person 
would normally have an expectation of privacy. Since “it 
is entirely reasonable to expect a police officer to 
investigate” in these circumstances, the occupant of 
the home waives their expectation of privacy. In 
finding no s.8 Charter breach, Smith J. concluded at 
para. 20: 
                                                 
1 (2000) Docket: C32948 (OntCA) 
[T]he initial entry of [the officers] was lawful, and did 
not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy on the 
part of the occupant of the premises in question. Their 
discovery of the marihuana grow operation was the result 
of an inadvertent discovery of evidence clearly visible in 
their attempt to assure themselves that neither an 
intruder nor an injured occupant was inside the premises. 
The criminal nature of the evidence was immediately 
apparent. Thus the requirements of the plain view seizure 
of the evidence was at this point established and the 
officers were fully entitled to remain on the premises to 
secure the scene while awaiting a search warrant.  
 
The application for the exclusion of evidence was thus 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
 
Editor’s note: Officers must be aware that this 
implied licence or invitation differs from the implied 
waiver that gets an officer from the sidewalk to the 
doorstep to communicate with the occupant, much like 
a door to door sales person. Although they both waive 
the privacy expectation of the homeowner or occupant, 
the former concerns legitimate police enquiries in 
gathering information, such as neighbourhood enquiries 
following a break and entry (gets you to the door2), 
while the latter involves the occupants expectation in 
the police acting on a reasonable suspicion (something 
more than a hunch but less than a reasonable beleif) to 
protect the homeowner’s interests (gets you onto the 
property and in some cases into the premise). 
Furthermore, homeowner interest waiver recognizes 
the need to investigate criminal activity perpetrated 
against the occupant, not by the occupant. Ultimately, 
the analysis will examine the motives of the police at 
the time of entry onto the property. In either case, 
the intention of the police is not to secure 
incriminating evidence against the homeowner. 
However, if while acting within the ambit of implied 
licence incriminating evidence is found, the entry and 
search is not turned into an unreasonable one merely 
because such evidence is discovered. 
 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Policy manuals are a poor substitute for training and 
should not be used as such3”. Richard N. Holden. 
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2 See Volume 1 Issue 1 for a detailed discussion on implied licence. 
3 (1986). Modern police management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc. at p. 
242. 
  CRASHING ON COUCH:  
NO STANDING TO ARGUE 
CHARTER BREACH 
R. v. Schwingenschlegel, 2002 ABQB 251 
 
The accused was lying on the couch 
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•
•
•
owner did not ask the accused if this person’s 
presence was acceptable or not; 
• the owner did not admit the accused as a guest or 
at all; 
• the accused had “crashed” at the trailer one night 
previously and the night before the police raid;  
• the owner’s use of the term “crashed” does not 
carry with it any degree of permanence to the 
V
Ain the front room of a friend’s 
trailer home when police entered 
while executing a search warrant. 
Surprised by the police raid, the 
ccused started to get up when he spilled several 
ackages of methamphetamine off his chest onto the 
loor. He was taken into custody after reaching under 
he cushions of the couch where police later found a 
eapon. The accused had met the owner of the trailer 
wo days earlier and had been previously invited to 
pend the night. The owner further invited the accused 
o use the trailer as “a place to crash” if needed. In 
he early morning of the raid, the accused had found 
he trailer locked and entered through a window. The 
wner was unbothered by the accused’s presence or 
ode of entry and left for an appointment; it was 
uring the owner’s absence that police entered the 
railer.  
he accused argued that the search warrant was 
efective and that the evidence should be excluded. 
owever, the trial judge found that the accused did 
ot have a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
herefore did not have standing to complain that his 
ersonal right under s.8 of the Charter was violated; 
ence it was unnecessary to rule on the validity of the 
earch warrant.  
he accused appealed arguing that he should have been 
ble to contest the validity of the warrant because he 
id have a reasonable expectation of privacy. On 
ppeal, Wilson J. framed the question as: “Do we have 
n expectation of privacy when, as house guests of our 
riends, we are, in their absence, staying inside their 
ocked homes?” In rejecting the accused’s appeal, the 
lberta Court of Queen’s Bench noted the following 
actors: 
 the accused was offered “a place to crash”; 
 the accused did not have keys to the trailer; the 
owner had the only keys ; 
 when police entered, there was another male 
present who had been admitted by the owner 
before his departure for the appointment; the 
accused resting there or that he kept any personal 
belongings there other than what he had on his 
person; and 
• the accused had no propriety or possessory 
interest in the trailer. 
 
The Court held that on the totality of the 
circumstances the trial judge made no error is his 
assessment of the privacy interest of the accused and 
the appeal was dismissed. The evidence was admissible 
and the conviction upheld. 
 
Complete case at www.albertacourts.ca 
 
Y.O. PEACE BOND INVALID: 
YOUTH COURT LACKS 
JURISDICTION 
R. v. J.L.S., 2002 BCCA 174 
 
The BCCA ruled that a youth court 
olume 2 Issue 4 
pril 2002 judge cannot order a young person to 
enter into a recognizance under 
s.810 of the Criminal Code.  In this 
case, a young offender was placed on 
a one-year peace bond with conditions including 
abstinence from the consumption of alcohol. The 
accused later violated this condition and was charged 
under s. 811 of the Code for breaching the 
recognizance. At the trial, the accused admitted all the 
essential elements of the breach allegation but argued 
that the court did not have jurisdiction to place the 
accused on a peace bond in the first place. The Court 
agreed and the breach charge was dismissed.  The 
Crown successfully appealed the acquittal to the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia suggesting that the 
accused was not entitled to challenge the validity of 
the recognizance as a defence to the charge of breach 
of recognizance. In other words, the accused should 
have challenged the peace bond on appeal from the 
original order, not during the breach of recognizance 
proceedings (also known as a collateral attack). The 
accused further appealed to BC’s highest court.    
   
3
 Although the BCCA dismissed the accused’s appeal on 
the “collateral attack” issue, it did hold that a youth 
court does not have the jurisdiction under the Young 
Offenders Act (YOA) to bind a young person with a 
recognizance under s.810 of the Criminal Code. Section 
5(1) of the YOA gives a youth court exclusive 
jurisdiction with respect to “offences” committed by 
young persons.  However, s.810 of the Criminal Code 
does not create an offence even though an information 
is sworn, but is a form of preventative justice. 
Therefore, the wording used in s.5 of the YOA 
prevents a youth court from imposing such an order. 
 
Editor’s note:  The Court noted that a youth court 
judge does have the power to place young persons on 
recognizances other than a s.810 Code recognizance 
such as those found in s.49 of the YOA. Furthermore, 
the new Youth Criminal Justice Act, which is expected 
to come into force in the spring of 2003, includes a 
specific provision allowing a youth court to bind a young 
person with a s.810 recognizance.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
IN NOT CHARGING OFFICER 
UPHELD 
Meyer v. Attorney General et al., 
 
2002 BCSC 257 
 
The plaintiff alleged she was 
assaulted after being approached by 
a CPR police officer investigating a 
trespass violation contrary to the 
British Columbia Railway Safety Act.  
After complaining to a local RCMP detachment, she was 
directed to lodge her complaint with the CPR Police 
which was ultimately dismissed. During this time, the 
accused was convicted of trespassing and sentenced to 
10 days in prison.  Although her subsequent conviction 
appeal was dismissed, her sentence was varied to an 
absolute discharge. The plaintiff returned to the local 
RCMP detachment and was told to complain to the 
RCMP Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner but 
was told by the Commission that they lacked 
jurisdiction to investigate complaints against the CPR 
police. 
 
The plaintiff returned to the local RCMP detachment 
where a complaint of assault was taken but nothing was 
done until almost a year later when a report was 
submitted to Crown Counsel for consideration of 
assault charges. Of course, this precluded a summary 
conviction prosecution due to the six-month statute of 
limitations under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code for 
summary offences.  Although the Crown could proceed 
by way of indictment, it was decided that there were 
“no exceptional or compelling circumstances” to 
warrant this process. The plaintiff sought an order 
from the Court compelling the Attorney General of 
British Columbia to prosecute the CPR police officer.    
 
In dismissing the plaintiff’s application, the court held 
that a judge may only interfere with prosecutorial 
discretion in cases of “flagrant impropriety” which can 
“only be established by proof of misconduct bordering 
on corruption, violation of the law, [or] bias against or 
for a particular individual or offence “.  In this case, 
McKinnon J. found no evidence that the prosecutor 
conducted himself in such a manner when deciding not 
to prosecute.   
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
CONSENT SEARCHES: SIMON 
SAYS OR MOTHER MAY I? 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
Warrantless searches 
conducted without consent are 
presumptively unreasonable 
because, prima facie, they 
encroach on a person’s 
expectation of privacy4. 
However, a person may waive their privacy rights 
protected by s.8 of the Charter5. If a search is 
consensual, no search warrants are necessary and a 
consent search or seizure is no search or seizure at all 
for the purposes of s.86. The question becomes whether, 
having regard to all the circumstances, permission was in 
fact given7. The burden in establishing consent on the 
balance of probabilities rests with the Crown (police). 
 
                                                 
4 R. v. Blinch (1993) 83 C.C.C. (3d) 158 (B.C.C.A.) at p.169. 
5 R. v. Wills  (1992) 70 C.C.C. (3d) 529 at p.541, R. v. Glasgo 2000 BCSC 1140 at 
para. 23. 
6 R. v. Wills  (1992) 70 C.C.C. (3d) 529 at p.549, see also R. v. Fowler (1990) 61 
C.C.C. (3d) 505 (Man.C.A.) per Hubard J.A. at p.513. 
7 R. v. Duncan [1993] B.C.J. No.653 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 6. 
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 Requirements 
 
The test for valid consent is two fold8.  
 
• volition. A proper waiver requires an intentional or 
voluntary relinquishment of a known right9. Consent 
may be given expressly by words, either orally or in 
writing, or may be implicit by actions or conduct10. 
In fact, permission to search can effectively be 
given without particular formality, even in a cursory 
fashion11.  
 
• knowledge. The person must be aware of the 
consequences of giving consent. 
 
Volition 
 
Mere compliance, passive acquiescence, or failure to 
object by themselves do not amount to valid consent12. 
Consent means to actually agree and cooperate13 and 
must be consciously, freely, and voluntarily given14. For 
consent to be validly given, a person “must have the 
ability to prevent the police from conducting a search or 
seizure by withholding…consent”15; the person must have 
the freedom to prefer one option (no search) over 
another (search). Consent cannot be the result of police 
oppression, compulsion, coercion, or other external 
conduct negating the right to choose. Police 
representations that they would otherwise apply for a 
search warrant if consent is not obtained, in proper 
circumstances, does not necessarily require a finding of 
coercion16.  
 
Included under the rubric of voluntariness is an 
awareness of the right to refuse the search17. An 
awareness of the right to refuse may be implied by the 
conduct of the person such as their initial hesitation in 
permitting a search, questioning the police as to why the 
search is being requested18, or by a person's awareness 
that they need not cooperate with the police19. 
Although, the police are under no obligation to formally 
advise a person of their right to refuse consent, it would 
be prudent for the police to expressly tell a person of 
this right since the onus lies with Crown in proving 
volition20. 
                                                 
8 R. v. Kennedy 2000 BCCA 362 at para.23, R. v. Head [1994] B.C.J. No.2522 
(B.C.C.A.) at para. 22. 
9 R. v. Blinch (1993) 83 C.C.C. (3d) 158 (B.C.C.A.) at p.169. 
10 R. v. Meyers [1987] 52 Alta.L.R. (2d) 156 (Alta.Q.B.). 
11 R. v. Duncan [1993] B.C.J. No.653 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 6. 
12 R. v. Head [1994] B.C.J. No.2522 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 18. 
13 R. v. Knox  (1996) 109 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) at p.485. 
14 R. v. Meyers [1987] 52 Alta.L.R. (2d) 156 (Alta.Q.B.).. 
15 R. v Stillman [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 at para.60. 
16 R. v. Haglof 2000 BCCA 604 at para. 42. 
17 R. v. Head [1994] B.C.J. No.2522 (B.C.C.A.) at para.22. 
18 R. v. Wotton (1998) Docket: GSC-16008 (P.E.I.S.C.) at para.10. 
19 R. v. Eakin (2000) Docket:C24289 (Ont.C.A.) 
 
Knowledge 
 
The right to make a valid choice as to whether or not to 
permit the search requires sufficient available 
information to make the choice meaningful21. The 
standard of an informed constitutional waiver must be 
met22. The person consenting must be aware of the 
consequences of waiving their s.8 right.  The degree of 
awareness required is dependent on the particular facts 
of the case and it will not be necessary for the person 
to have a detailed comprehension of every possible 
outcome of their consent. However, if the police are 
planning to use the product of the seizure in a different 
investigation from the one in which the person was 
detained, the person should be made aware of that 
fact23. If a person is mentally incompetent, intoxicated, 
or a language barrier exists, there will be a question of 
the level of their awareness (similar to the questions 
raised for the right to counsel waiver). Included under 
the rubric of knowledge is: 
 
¾ an awareness of the nature of conduct to which 
the person is being asked to consent (the search), 
and  
 
¾ an awareness of the potential consequences of 
giving consent. The person must appreciate in a 
general way what their position is vis-à-vis the 
ongoing police investigation24. In some cases this 
may include that any material found may be used 
against the person. Deceit or trickery by the police 
of the true reason for the search will invalidate the 
consent25. 
 
A court may infer from the facts that it was more likely 
than not that the person was aware the police were 
searching for evidence. Thus, where a person is given a 
Charter warning and police caution regarding an 
investigation of an attempted break and enter, the 
person knew the officer was looking for evidence that 
would connect the person with the matter under 
investigation26. Although there is no affirmative duty to 
advise the person of the consequences, the onus placed 
                                                 
20 R. v. Blackstock [1997] O.J. No.3597 (Ont.C.A.) 
21 R. v. Borden [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.) per Iacobucci J. for the majority. 
22 R. v. Deprez (1994) 95 C.C.C. (3d) 29 (Man.C.A.) at p.36. 
23 R. v. Borden [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.) per Iacobucci J. for the majority. 
24 R. v. Wotton (1998) Docket: GSC-16008 (P.E.I.S.C.) at para.11. 
25R. v. Adams (2001) Docket:C34243 (OntCA) 
26 R. v. Head [1994] B.C.J. No.2522 (B.C.C.A.) at para.31, see also R. v. Wells (2001) 
Docket:C13744 (Ont.C.A.) at para.43-44.. 
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 on the Crown by the waiver requirement once again 
disappears in large measure if the police advise the 
individual that anything found may be used as evidence27. 
 
Withdrawing Consent 
 
Consent may be withdrawn at any time during the 
search. However, withdrawal of consent may not be used 
in forming reasonable grounds to justify a search28. The 
police cannot use the fact a person invokes their 
constitutional protection and draw an adverse inference 
when they change their mind and revoke permission they 
did not have to give in the first place. If at the time 
consent is withdrawn, the officer has sufficient grounds 
to justify an arrest, an arrest may be effectuated and a 
search incidental to lawful arrest may be undertaken.  
 
Scope 
 
General Consent 
 
Consent may be of a general nature allowing a complete 
search of the area, place, person or thing. Where 
evidence is obtained under "open ended" consent, 
evidence may be used for any legitimate police purpose 
unless limits, if any, were placed on the consent29.   
 
Limited Consent 
 
Consent may be limited in purpose or by location and a 
search exceeding the limitations will be unreasonable. 
The search may be “conditional” or limited in scope by 
the person consenting or by the police. For example, the 
police may preface their request for consent by 
informing the person that the object pursued, such as a 
blood sample for DNA testing, will only be used for 
comparison to a specific investigation. Similarly, consent 
given for a specific purpose such as to enter a residence 
to search for a person does not authorize a search of 
the remainder of the residence once the person sought 
has been located30. Moreover, consent by an individual 
for a limited non-police purpose such as the taking of 
blood by a physician for medical purposes does not grant 
police officers the right to use the blood for 
investigative purposes31. Consent limited by location may 
include circumstances such as consent to search the 
interior of a vehicle but not the trunk.  
 
                                                 
27 R. v. Wills (1992) 70 C.C.C. (3d) 529 (Ont.C.A.) 
28 R. v. Brownridge 2000 BCSC 795 at para. 36, R. v. Brownridge 1999 BCCA 27 at 
para. 16. 
29 R. v. Arp [1998] 3 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.) 
30 R. v. Smith (1998) 126 C.C.C. (3d) 62 (Alta.C.A.) 
31 R. v. Pohorestsky [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945 (S.C.C.) 
Third Party Consent 
 
For consent to be valid it can only be given by someone 
having the authority to grant the consent. A person who 
has a sole expectation of privacy may consent to an 
intrusion into that private area. What governs the 
legitimacy of obtaining consent from a person with a 
"shared" expectation of privacy? If an individual would 
not reasonably expect another person to be able to 
authorize a search, then that person cannot validly 
consent to the search32. Stated positively, if a “suspect“ 
reasonably expects that a third person could authorize a 
search, the third party could consent to the search. The 
question becomes whether the consent given by the 
third party, which led to the invasion of the suspect's 
privacy is an acceptable substitute for the absence of 
prior judicial authorization33. Examples where third 
party consent may become a viable search or seizure 
option for police include co-habitants, spousal34, 
parental35, employee/employer, or registered 
owner/occupant of vehicle relationships. Although a 
third party may in some cases validly consent vicariously 
to a search, private areas not accessible to the third 
party would remain such. 
 
For example, hotel management could not consent to 
police entry and search of a hotel room where the room 
was rented, the registered guests were absent, and a 
"Do not Disturb" sign had been left on the door. The 
renter of a hotel suite maintains a reasonable 
expectation of privacy from uninvited state intrusions 
with respect to their belongings left inside the room 
despite their awareness that cleaning staff will enter 
their rooms daily for cleaning purposes. In particular, 
objects not left in plain view or stored in areas that do 
not require daily maintenance remain private. Thus, 
where police erroneously entered a rented hotel room at 
the invitation of the hotel manager, rather than 
obtaining the permission of the occupants, the entry and 
search constituted a violation of s.836.  
 
                                                 
32 “Search and Seizure Law in Canada”, 1993, Hutchison, Carswell Thomson 
Professional Publishing 
33 R. v. Mercer (1992) 70 C.C.C. (3d) 180 (Ont.C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 
74 C.C.C. (3d) vi. 
34 See for example R. v. Van Wyk [1999] O.J. No.3515 (Ont.S.C.J.) at para. 41. 
35 See for example R. v. Rai [1998] B.C.J. No. 2187 (B.C.S.C.), R. v. Wells [1998] 
O.J. No.3371 (Ont.C.J.) 
36 R. v. Mercer (1992) 70 C.C.C. (3d) 180 (Ont.C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 
74 C.C.C. (3d) vi. 
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 Right to Counsel 
 
The right to counsel is triggered on 
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s.10(b) Charter violation will render the search 
unreasonable41.  
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If the detainee or arrestee does not wish to exercise 
V
Aarrest or detention, not on search or 
seizure37. Therefore, informing a person 
of their right to counsel is dependent on 
whether in law there is a detention or 
arrest. In many cases, even where the 
ight to counsel has been denied, “the denial… has no 
elevance to a determination of the reasonableness of a 
.8 search”38 
re-Detention Consent 
he right to retain and instruct counsel derives from 
rrest or detention and not from the fact of being 
earched39. When the police attempt to obtain consent 
rom an individual in the absence of detention or arrest, 
here is no obligation on the police to provide 
nformation respecting the right to counsel.  
onsent Following Arrest or Detention  
olice may legitimately seek 
onsent from a person who is 
etained or arrested.. In R. v. 
aglof 2000 BCCA 604, police 
btained valid consent from a 
erson who was under arrest and 
n custody at the police station. 
he accused had provided written co
esidence in the face of representati
ould otherwise apply for a search wa
f the police detain an individual and 
onsent following the detention, the
ight to counsel and the police are o
he detainee of their right. If the
earch is dependent on consent 
rrestee, the police must provide 
easonable opportunity to exercise th
efore obtaining consent if the pe
esire to contact counsel. In the abs
onsent is valid provided the person
he opportunity afforded them and 
o the search and/or seizure40. How
btain consent and either fail to ad
heir right to counsel or fail to pr
pportunity for the person to exerci
                                                
7 R. v. Rube (1992) 10 B.C.A.C. 48 (B.C.C.A.) 
8 R. v. Carpenter (2001) 151 C.C.C. (3d) 205 (B.C.C.A.) 
9 R. v. Debot [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 
0 R. v. Deprez (1994) 95 C.C.C. (3d) 29 (Man.C.A.) at p.3
their right to counsel, consent can be validly obtained. 
This may occur in circumstances where a person has 
been arrested and an officer wishes to search an area 
beyond the scope authorized as incidental to lawful 
arrest without obtaining a warrant.  
 
Consent v. other Lawful Authority 
 
Where a police officer has lawful authority to conduct a 
search without consent, such as by warrant or 
otherwise, it is an unnecessary step to attempt to obtain 
consent. In R. v. Brownridge 2000 BCSC 795, a police 
officer testified he had reasonable grounds to search a 
vehicle without consent, yet the officer asked the 
accused for permission. The Court found the officer's 
evidence of the existence of reasonable grounds for an 
arrest inconsistent with his conduct, suggesting the 
officer was unsure of his authority. The Court drew an 
adverse conclusion from the conflict between the 
officer’s assertion he could search without consent and 
olume 2 Issue 4 
pril 2002 nsent to search his 
ons that the police 
rrant.  
seek that person's 
 detainee has the 
bligated to inform 
 lawfulness of the 
of a detainee or 
the person with a 
eir right to counsel 
rson asserts their 
ence of waiver, the 
 took advantage of 
thereafter agreed 
ever, if the police 
vise the person of 
ovide a reasonable 
se their right, the 
                                                
9. 
the fact he attempted to obtain permission.  
 
Subjective Good Faith 
 
Where the police mistakenly believe they have consent 
to conduct a search, the otherwise invalid search will not 
be rendered valid. However, this mistaken belief is an 
important consideration in determining whether to admit 
the evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter42. In 
assessing the officer’s good faith belief, the Court will 
review the interaction between the person and the 
police, including the words spoken by the police and the 
responses given by the person43. A finding of good faith 
may mitigate the Charter violation and favour inclusion 
of evidence. 
 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do 
we ask any man’s permission when requiring him to obey 
it”. Theodore Roosevelt (1904) 
 
41 R. v. Debot [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140  per Lamer J. 
42 R. v. Leveillee (1984) Docket:CA831359 (B.C.C.A.) 
43 R. v. Tang 2001 BCCA 165. 
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 B.C.’s 2000 CRIME STATS 
 
The Municipal Police case 
burdens for the year 2000 have 
recently been published by the 
Police Services Division of the 
Public Safety and Regulatory 
Branch, Ministry of Attorney Gen
as follows: 
 
The RCMP municipal detachment w
burden was the Courtenay RCMP
officer while North Saanich RCMP 
cases per officer. Overall, there w
RCMP officers policing a populatio
260,694 Criminal Code offences f
rate of 119 offences per 1000 peop
 
Spousal Assault50 Incidents
 
In British Columbia, there were 1
incidents reported (Municipal and
increase of 254 from 9,867 in 199
assault incidents, 7,916 involved m
involved female offenders and 
parties of a spousal or intimate re
each other. From the 10,121 incid
Code offences were investigated
people charged51 with 3,610 convictions52. Forty nine 
percent, or 4,944 incidents, were alcohol related. A 
municipal breakdown follows: 
                                                 
44 Complete data available at www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/pol
45 Based on authorized police strength as of Decemb
46 Populations are based on Canada Census data. 
47 Criminal Code offences  obtained from Uniform C
not include traffic offences. 
48 The number of Criminal Code offences per 1000 p
commuters, or “part time” residents such as student
49 The number of Criminal Code offences per author
50 Including marriages, common-law marriages, same
partners. 
Dept. Strength
45 
Population46 Cr
47 
Victoria 178 74,996 16,
Abbotsford 143 115,195 10,
Vancouver 1,066 567,351 78
New 
Westminster 
111 54,904 8,1
Nelson 17 9,677 1,1
Esquimalt 33 16,400 2,0
Port Moody 30 23,819 1,8
Delta 138 101,440 7,2
Saanich 136 106,814 6,9
Oak Bay 22 17,664 94
Central 
Saanich 
21 15,553 85
West 
Vancouver 
77 44,679 26
Total 1,972 1,148,492 137
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April 2002 eral44. A summary is 
 
ith the highest case 
 with 151 cases per 
had the lowest at 53 
ere 2,669 municipal 
n of 2,187,606 with 
or an average crime 
le.  
 
0,121 spousal assault 
 RCMP) in 2000; an 
9. Of these spousal 
ale offenders, 1,307 
898 involved both 
lationship assaulting 
ents, 11,296 Criminal 
 resulting in 8,916 
ice_services 
er 31, 2000. 
rime Reporting Survey and do 
opulation excluding tourists, 
s. 
ized police strength. 
-sex relationships, and intimate 
 
Department Total Offenders53 
Abbotsford 250 
Central Saanich 1 
Delta 113 
Esquimalt 25 
Nelson 8 
New Westminster 211 
Oak Bay 7 
Port Moody 35 
Saanich 57 
Vancouver 1,186 
Victoria 112 
West Vancouver 30 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Although there are well-settled restrictions on their 
treatment of detained persons and certain affirmative 
obligations set out in the Charter and the Code, the 
primary function of the police is to investigate crime 
with a view to solving it and obtaining a conviction54”. 
OntCA Justice Finlayson. 
 
OUR ERROR 
 
In last month’s issue of “In Service: 
10-8”, the Nelson Police Department’s 
2001 Enhanced Counterattack 
Statistics were incorrectly reported. 
The statistics reported were for the 
2001 Christmas Counterattack Campaign and not for 
the whole year. The correct numbers for the 2001 
Enhanced Counterattack Roadcheck statistics for 
Nelson are: 
 
Vehicles 
checked 
Roadside BACs Impaired 
Charges 
215s 
23,309 123 5 66 
 
We apologize for any inconvenience or embarrassment 
this may have caused. 
                                                 
51 An RTCC has been filed and does not necessarily imply the swearing of an 
information. 
52 Either plead guilty or found guilty. 
53 Detailed data for Esquimalt, Vancouver, and Victoria was not available and was 
estimated by the Ministry. 
54 R. v. Bain (1989), 47 C.C.C. (3d) 250 (Ont. C.A.). 
imes Crime 
Rate48 
Case 
Burden49 
355 218 92 
791 94 75 
,107 138 73 
20 148 73 
89 123 70 
88 127 63 
11 76 60 
60 72 53 
42 65 51 
8 54 43 
0 55 40 
78 60 35 
,139 119 70 
8
 INTENTION TO CARRY OUT 
THREAT NOT NECESSARY 
R. v. Deneault, 2002 BCCA 178 
 
The accused was convicted of 
knowingly uttering a threat to cause 
Even though the threats were not exclusively directed 
at the forestry workers, it is not necessary under this 
section that “any person” be restricted to a specific 
individual target; it is sufficient that the threat be 
made against an “ascertainable group of citizens”. In 
this case, the threats were directed against non-
members of the Shuswap Nation finding themselves in death or bodily harm contrary to 
s.264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code 
which reads as follows: 
 
Every one commits an offence who, in any manner, knowingly 
utters, conveys or causes any person to receive a threat to 
cause death or bodily harm to any person;  
 
Two forestry workers performing road inspections 
were told by the accused, who was in company of two 
other native males, that he was taking over and kicking 
everyone off the land of the Shuswap nation by 
escorting them out of the Upper Adams Valley and was 
“willing to shoot and burn to protect his land”. The two 
forestry workers proceeded to leave the area and were 
followed out by the accused and the two other males 
for approximately 2 kms.  
 
The accused appealed his conviction arguing that the 
words spoken did not constitute a threat to be taken 
seriously nor did he threaten “any person” as the term 
has been defined in law. The accused contended that 
the words used were “at best a frustrated, bitter 
outburst and at worst an idle threat”. Furthermore, 
even though the accused said he was willing to shoot 
and burn to protect his land, he never stated he would 
or planned to do so. 
 
In dismissing the appeal, the BCCA noted that the 
actus reus of the offence is the uttering of the 
threats of death or bodily harm while the mens rea is 
that the words spoken were meant to intimidate or to 
be taken seriously; there is no need for the Crown to 
prove the intention to carry out the threat. Since the 
accused did not testify in this case, the subjective 
intent of the accused could be inferred by looking 
objectively at the words used and their context. The 
Appeal Court stated, at para. 49: 
 
Given the words used by the appellant and the context in 
which he used them, along with the evidence of his having 
followed the forestry workers for some distance after 
his encounter with them, … there was ample evidence 
from which the trial judge could conclude that the 
appellant intended the words he uttered to intimidate 
and to be taken seriously by the forestry workers and 
others who came into the Upper Adams Lake Valley. 
the Upper Adams Lake area, and given the context of 
the utterance, forestry workers in particular. Here, 
the ascertainable group of citizens was identifiable as 
those non-Shuswap members entering the area.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
QUESTIONING DURING 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
PROPER DESPITE NO s.10(b) 
WARNING 
R. v. Sloan, 2001 ABPC 116 
 
Two police officers were on patrol 
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April 2002 when they stopped a car with a 
license plate not matching the 
vehicle (which was apparently not 
registered or insured). Suspecting 
hat it may be stolen and wanting to know if she was 
onnected to the vehicle, an officer asked the accused 
assenger for identification. She orally provided a 
ame and the officer followed this up by asking if she 
ad any identification. The accused opened her purse 
n her own volition and the officer saw a quantity of 
ostly unpacked syringes in plain view in the open 
urse. The officer asked the accused “What are all 
hose needles for” to which she replied she was a 
eroin addict.   
he officer asked her to step from the vehicle to 
btain some form of photo identification and to 
urther investigate whether the needles were related 
o illegal drug activity. The officer asked the accused 
or photo identification and to empty the contents of 
he purse onto the hood of the car. When she dumped 
er purse out, the needles, and a cigarette package, 
hich the accused attempted to conceal, fell out. 
fter the officer looked inside the cigarette package 
nd found a deck of cocaine, he arrested the accused 
or its possession. Later, the officer warned the 
ccused about obstruction and consequently obtained 
he accused’s true identity. The accused argued that 
he officer had no right to question a passenger, failed 
9
 to provide the accused the s.10(b) Charter warning 
prior to asking what the needles were for, and that the 
search was unreasonable because there was no warrant 
or consent. 
 
The Charter and Investigative Questioning 
 
If finding the request for identification reasonable in 
the circumstances, the trial judge stated: 
The licence plate did not match the vehicle. The 
registered owner was a woman and obviously not the man 
who was driving. Consequently, this was much more than a 
traffic stop. It was a criminal investigation relating 
possibly to a stolen vehicle with two potentially involved 
parties: the driver and the passenger. As such, the police 
had the right and obligation to question both the driver 
and the passenger, with a view to determining their right 
to be in the vehicle at all. The police were engaged in the 
lawful execution of their duty.  
Clearly, upon stopping the vehicle, the two occupants 
were detained. It was not an arbitrary detention. It did 
not infringe s.9 of the Charter. The constables had 
articulable cause to detain them and demand 
identification from each. They had no obligation to either 
arrest or advise either of the occupants of their Charter 
rights before demanding identification. At this point , no 
search had been undertaken.  (emphasis added) 
Furthermore: 
Defence counsel argues the constable should have 
confined his questioning to matters relating to ownership 
of the car, asking the accused a question such as, "Does 
this vehicle belong to you?" instead of simply asking for 
identification. With respect, I disagree. As indicated 
before, this was not simply a traffic stop; it was a 
criminal investigation. When police are in an investigative 
stage such as this, surely they have the right to initiate 
their investigation as they deem fit under all the 
circumstances. Asking first for identification is 
reasonable, as the police have a right to first establish 
with whom they are dealing.  
In addition, the police have the power to detain a person 
in the course of a police investigation where there is a 
constellation of objectively discernible facts which give 
the detaining officer reasonable cause to suspect the 
detainee is criminally implicated in the activity under 
investigation.  
The judge found the accused opened her purse on her 
own without prompting or suggestion by the police. The 
needles were in plain view and at this time the officer 
“had articulable cause to suspect the accused was 
implicated in illegal drug activity and to detain her 
pending further investigation”. As stated by the trial 
judge, “[w]ith real evidence staring him in the face, his 
decision to carry on the investigation and further 
detain the accused, was neither based on intuition or 
hunch”.  
 
The accused also argued that the officer should have 
ceased questioning and immediately arrested and 
Chartered the accused upon seeing the needles. The 
judge found that when an officer “observes unusual 
evidence leading him to reasonably believe criminal 
activity is afoot, he may make reasonable inquires 
aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions without 
either arresting the suspect or reading her Charter 
rights or providing her with the opportunity to consult 
with counsel”.  At para. 31, Daniel J. stated: 
 
Had [the accused] actually been an innocent diabetic, and 
had she been immediately arrested, without further 
inquiry, surely defence would have roundly criticized the 
constable. It would be alleged he had insufficient 
grounds for the arrest and that he should have asked her 
for a reasonable explanation for possessing the needles 
before arresting her. In all investigations police are 
compelled to ask questions for the legitimate purpose of 
sorting out facts to determine if arrest is appropriate. 
To require arrest before all reasonable investigative 
inquiries are completed would immediately paralyze police 
forces, quickly fill our jails and clog our courts with 
lawsuits against the police for unreasonable and unlawful 
arrest. 
 
The officer was simply providing the accused with an 
“opportunity to give him a reasonable explanation in 
what otherwise were extremely suspicious 
circumstances for her”. In this case, the question was 
“a sound and justifiable inquiry based on real evidence 
voluntarily displayed in plain view for the [officer] to 
see”. The judge found there had been no s.10(b) 
Charter violation by either the demand for the 
identification or the question regarding the possession 
of the needles.  
 
The Charter and the Purse Emptying 
 
Having found the initial opening of the purse voluntary, 
the Court next examined the emptying of the purse’s 
contents. The accused argued that this search was 
unreasonable and furthermore, the officer should have 
read the s.10(b) Charter rights at this time and allowed 
an opportunity to consult with counsel prior to 
commencing the request to empty the purse. The judge 
found that the search of the purse was lawful because 
the officer had the right to search for identification. 
However, at this time the officer had seen the drug 
Volume 2 Issue 4 
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paraphernalia and had reasonable grounds to search for 
evidence; he should have informed the accused of her 
right to counsel. In any event, the evidence was 
admissible under s.24(2) of the Charter. 
 
Complete case at www.albertacourts.ca 
 
THROWING PACKAGE OVER 
PRISON FENCE: TRAFFICKING 
VERDICT REASONABLE 
R. v. Kwok, 2002 BCCA 177 
 
A correctional officer observed a 
male acting suspiciously outside the 
perimeter fence surrounding a 
prison. After observing the man on 
several occasions approach the fence 
and then retreat, the officer saw him throw a package 
over the fence. The officer retrieved the package 
(which contained heroin), exited the correctional 
centre, and pursued the man through an adjacent park. 
While walking along the park trail, the officer 
apprehended the accused (who matched the 
description of the male the officer saw at the fence) 
standing slightly off the trail.   
 
Among other grounds, the accused argued the trial 
judge’s verdict was unreasonable because the evidence 
could not support a finding of guilt.  First, the accused 
asserted there was no evidence of trafficking or that 
“he knowingly trafficked to a person in jail”. Since the 
evidence was unclear whether the accused knew the 
fence surrounded a prison, his actions were equally 
consistent with simply discarding the package. In 
finding this submission unacceptable, the BCCA held 
the nature of the packaging (heroin, a needle, and a 
rock for projectile weight) was consistent with the 
drug trade and that the accused intentionally threw it 
over the fence. This was sufficient to warrant the 
conviction and it was not necessary to prove the 
accused” knowingly trafficked to a person in jail”.  
 
Second, the accused argued he was not the person who 
threw the package over the fence but was merely in 
the park watching birds and enjoying the solitude, 
despite the officer testifying he observed the accused 
at the fence, pursued and found the same person, and 
also identified him in court. The trial judge found the 
accused’s evidence “vague and unsatisfactory” and 
“inconsistent” with other evidence. The Appeal Court 
refused to interfere with the trail judge’s decision 
finding “not only was the evidence sufficient, it was 
overwhelming”. The appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
‘PRESSURE FILLED’, INTENSE, 
& PERSISTENT QUESTIONING 
ADMISSIBLE 
R. v. J.P.F., 2002 BCSC 106 
 
The accused was arrested by police 
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Volume 2 Issue 4 at the airport following his return 
from a vacation and advised of his 11
right to counsel. He was transported 
to the police station where, after 
peaking to counsel, he was interrogated by two police 
fficers for approximately three hours. At the 
eginning of the interview, the accused informed the 
fficers that his lawyer told him not to have any 
ontact with them. In spite of this information, the 
fficers persisted in questioning the accused. The 
uestioning was intense and consisted of lengthy 
onologues directed at the accused with the officers 
aking turns. Three breaks were taken during the 
nterrogation including a 12-minute cigarette break 
nitiated by the accused and one where the accused 
rote an apology to the victim. During the voire dire to 
etermine the admissibility of the accused’s 
tatements, Romilly J. described what occurred as 
ollows: 
During the interview, the accused was constantly asked to 
take the first step to getting help by admitting his crime. 
[The police] also pointed out that his daughter would have 
to take the stand in court if he did not own up to the 
crime. The accused eventually broke down into tears and 
admitted that he touched his daughter improperly on a 
few occasions when she was asleep and when he was 
bathing her. He stated that the writings which were found 
were only his thoughts and fantasies. The accused 
eventually wrote two letters of apology: one to his 
daughter… and the other to her mother…. He asked the 
police to deliver them for him. On his way to court after 
the interrogation he thanked the officers for their help. 
 
he accused argued that the persistent questioning 
iolated the common law confessions rule of 
oluntariness because the police statement that the 
ccused’s daughter would be required to testify was an 
nducement. Furthermore, it was submitted “the police 
hould have desisted from questioning the accused 
 when he told them that he was advised by his counsel 
not to talk to them”. 
 
Confessions Rule 
 
Under the confessions rule, a statement made to the 
police will only be admissible if the Crown can prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt it was made voluntarily 
(free from oppression or improper inducements). In 
some cases, persistent police questioning can create an 
atmosphere of oppression if extracting the statement 
overcomes the free will of the person to confess. In 
this case, the Court found that although the 
questioning was “pressure filled”, intense, and 
persistent, the accused was allowed breaks and the 
interrogation did not result in an atmosphere of 
oppression. 
Quid pro quo (kwid proh
kwoh) is a Latin term
meaning “something for
something”. 
 
Improper inducements, such as hope of advantage or 
the prospect of lenient treatment in exchange for a 
confession can also render a statement involuntary. 
This involves determining whether there was a quid pro 
quo offer. Although, the police implied that his 
daughter would have to testify if he did not talk, he 
might not see her again, and he would get psychological 
help if he confessed.  
These statements were not 
quid pro quo offers and did 
not render the statement 
involuntary. 
 
Continued Questioning after Consulting Counsel 
 
The accused also argued that the police violated his 
right to counsel by questioning him after he specifically 
told the officers his lawyer told him not to talk. Once 
an arrestee expresses a desire to contact counsel, the 
police are obligated to provide a reasonable opportunity 
for the communication to occur. Furthermore, the 
police must refrain from questioning the person until 
this opportunity is facilitated. However, once the 
arrestee speaks to counsel, the police are not 
prohibited from questioning an arrestee after they 
have retained counsel. Here, the Court found the 
officers were “entitled to continue to interview the 
accused even after he told them that his lawyer told 
him not to speak to them”. 
 
The statements were voluntary and not obtained in a 
manner that violated the accused’s Charter rights. 
Thus, the statements were admissible at trial. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc  
NEW CRIMINAL CODE & CDSA 
AMENDMENTS 
 
There have been several recent 
amendments to the Criminal Code 
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April 2002 and Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act. Highlights 
include: 
 
 The definition of “offence related property” under 
s.2 of the Criminal Code has been changed by 
removing references to criminal organization 
offences. The new definition reads: 
offence-related property" means any property, within or 
utside Canada,  
a) by means or in respect of which an indictable offence 
nder this Act is committed, 
b)that is used in any manner in connection with the 
ommission of an indictable offence under this Act, or 
c)that is intended for use for the purpose of committing an 
ndictable offence under this Act; 
 The definition of “offence related property” under 
s.2 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
has been changed by removing references to 
significantly modified real property. The new 
definition reads: 
offence-related property" means, with the exception of a 
ontrolled substance, any property, within or outside Canada,  
a) by means of or in respect of which a designated substance 
ffence is committed, 
b) that is used in any manner in connection with the 
ommission of a designated substance offence, or 
c) that is intended for use for the purpose of committing a 
esignated substance offence; 
 Intimidation under s.423 of the Criminal Code has 
been changed from a summary conviction offence 
to a dual offence now bringing a maximum 
punishment of 5 years. 
 A new intimidation section protecting justice 
system participants or journalists with a maximum 
sentence of 14 years has been added:  
.423.1  Criminal Code 
1) No person shall, without lawful authority, engage in 
onduct referred to in subsection (2) with the intent to 
rovoke a state of fear in  
a) a group of persons or the general public in order to impede 
he administration of criminal justice; 
b) a justice system participant in order to impede him or her 
n the performance of his or her duties; or 
c) a journalist in order to impede him or her in the 
12
 transmission to the public of information in relation to a 
criminal organization. 
Prohibited conduct  
(2) The conduct referred to in subsection (1) consists of 
(a) using violence against a justice system participant or a 
journalist or anyone known to either of them or destroying or 
causing damage to the property of any of those persons; 
(b) threatening to engage in conduct described in paragraph 
(a) in Canada or elsewhere; 
(c) persistently or repeatedly following a justice system 
participant or a journalist or anyone known to either of them, 
including following that person in a disorderly manner on a 
highway; 
(d) repeatedly communicating with, either directly or 
indirectly, a justice system participant or a journalist or 
anyone known to either of them; and 
(e) besetting or watching the place where a justice system 
participant or a journalist or anyone known to either of them 
resides, works, attends school, carries on business or happens 
to be. 
Punishment  
(3) Every person who contravenes this section is guilty of an 
indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of 
not more than fourteen years. 
 
• A new part (II.1) addressing terrorist offences has 
been added. Included in this part is a power of 
arrest for police officers. Section 83.3(4) of the 
Criminal Code now authorizes a peace officer to 
arrest, without a warrant, a person they believe will 
carry out a terrorist activity or suspect a 
recognizance is necessary to prevent the carrying 
out of terrorist activity if it is impracticable to 
first appear before a judge to lay an information 
and necessary to prevent the terrorist activity. 
Once arrested, the person must be taken before a 
provincial court judge. 
 
• A new mischief section specific to religious worship 
property has been added: 
 
s.430(4.1) Criminal Code  
Every one who commits mischief in relation to property that is 
a building, structure or part thereof that is primarily used for 
religious worship, including a church, mosque, synagogue or 
temple, or an object associated with religious worship located 
in or on the grounds of such a building or structure, or a 
cemetery, if the commission of the mischief is motivated by 
bias, prejudice or hate based on religion, race, colour or 
national or ethnic origin,  
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding ten years; or 
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction 
and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding eighteen 
months. 
OFFICER HAS A DUTY TO 
INVESTIGATE SUSPECTED 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
R. v. Robichaud, 2001 NBQB 245 
 
A police officer set up surveillance 
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April 2002 from an unmarked police car in a 
parking lot because of an ongoing 
theft from vehicle problem. After 
observing several people go to, 
pend a short time at, and then depart from a parked 
UV in the parking lot, the officer became suspicious, 
riefed a second officer in a marked unit, and asked 
im to check it out. This second officer observed a 
ehicle of similar description about to leave the parking 
ot as he drove by. The officer turned around and as he 
gain approached the parking lot, the driver of the 
UV turned around and proceeded back into the lot and 
arked. The officer checked the vehicle and found the 
ccused driver had a slight odour of alcohol on his 
reath. The accused submitted to a breath test and 
as charged with impaired driving and over 80mg%.  
t trial, the judge found the stop arbitrary and a 
iolation of s.9 of the Charter because the officer 
acked an articulable cause to stop the vehicle. The 
reathalyzer results were subsequently excluded under 
.24(2) of the Charter. The Crown successfully 
ppealed to the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s 
ench. Riordin J. found the detention to be justified in 
he circumstances. At para. 20 he stated: 
With the background information that he had been 
given…shortly before and in addition with what he 
observed as [the accused] drove back into the parking lot 
upon the police vehicle arriving in the immediate vicinity 
and obviously readily apparent, this officer had 
reasonable cause to suspect that the driver of the 
vehicle was possibly involved in illegal activity. The action 
of the officer to take further action and detain the 
operator of the vehicle was justified. The detention of 
[the accused] was not arbitrary and in my view there was 
an articulable cause for such action and the police 
officer’s conduct was justifiable. He was carrying out his 
duty to investigate suspected criminal activity. 
 
Note-able Quote 
The wicked man flees though no one pursues”. 
roverbs 28:1 
13
 ACCUSED MUST ASSERT 
DESIRE TO CONTACT COUNSEL: 
REMINDER NOT NECESSARY 
R. v. Leedahl, 2002 SKCA 5 
 
A police officer stopped the accused 
after observing his vehicle being 
operated in an erratic manner. After 
observing various signs of 
impairment, the officer arrested the 
accused for impaired driving and recited the standard 
right to counsel warning and breathalyzer demand. The 
accused indicated he understood the Charter warning 
but did not wish to contact a lawyer at that time. The 
accused subsequently provided breath samples with 
readings of 160mg% and 150mg%.  The accused argued, 
in part, that although he was asked at the roadside 
whether he wanted to speak to a lawyer, he expected 
to be asked again at the police station before providing 
a sample of his breath. The trial judge stated: 
 
[The accused] said he expected to be asked again. Well, 
he never communicated that to the officer. And there’s 
really nothing in the evidence that would indicate that 
the officer would have expected to have to tell him again. 
 
…an officer is not expected to know about secret doubts 
or misunderstandings on the part of a suspect. He’s 
entitled to assume, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, that the accused understood what his rights 
were, especially when he said he did. Also entitled in the 
absence of some unusual circumstances to assume that 
the accused will request a call when the first reasonable 
opportunity presents itself. 
 
Although the accused was convicted at trial of having a 
blood alcohol level over 80mg%, his conviction was 
overturned on appeal to the Saskatchewan court of 
Queen’s Bench because the officer’s imperfect 
compliance with s.10(b) of the Charter; the officer 
should have again asked the accused if he wanted to 
call a lawyer at the police office. On further appeal to 
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, the conviction was 
restored.  
 
Tallis J.A. for the unanimous Appeal Court found the 
officer properly advised the accused of his right to 
counsel and was under no obligation to go further 
unless the accused asserted a desire to exercise the 
right. Furthermore, the burden in establishing non-
compliance with the Charter lies with the accused; the 
prosecution does not need to prove compliance. In this 
case there was “no suggestion that [the accused] was 
incapable of understanding the right to counsel or that 
he was incapable of acting on his right”.  
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
 
PHOTOS OF BODY INCIDENT 
TO ARREST 
R. v. Ilina, 2001 MBQB 317 
 
The accused was arrested and 
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husband after she had been 
transported to the police station and 
left in an interview room for just 
over an hour. She was advised of her right to counsel 
and cautioned but declined to contact counsel. Over 
the next 7 hours and 45 minutes she was interviewed 
three times. She had agreed to provide bodily samples 
including hair, saliva, blood, and fingernail clippings. She 
was told that she was not obligated to provide the 
samples and that they may be used as evidence against 
her. The accused was also subject to a non-consentual 
strip search by a female officer to view her body for 
injuries. Finally, photographs were taken of the 
accused with a particular focus on her hands. 
 
Although the accused’s statements were ruled 
inadmissible because they had not been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt to be voluntary, the consent to 
provide bodily samples was valid. The police had 
explained there was no requirement to participate and 
if provided, they could be used as evidence. In holding 
the strip search and subsequent photographs to be 
lawful as an incident to arrest, Monnin J. at para. 85 
stated: 
 
Given the information the police had at the time, it was 
reasonable to make a further investigation as to whether 
or not [the accused] had injuries or marks on her body 
given the violence of the attack and the amount of blood 
at the premises. It was not an unreasonable step to take 
in the investigation in order to preserve evidence. 
 
Similarly, the taking of photographs of [the accused’s] 
hands and of her body at the time is a matter which I 
find falls within the requirement to preserve evidence 
when done reasonably and in keeping with powers 
incidental to arrest. 
 
As a result, the evidence from the bodily samples, strip 
search, and photographs were admissible. 
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 INSERTED OBJECT A WEAPON: 
OFFENCE MADE OUT 
R. v. Lamy, 2002 SCC 25 
 
The victim accepted a ride from a 
bar offered by the accused. During 
the ride however, the accused made 
a stop at his home and invited her in. 
At his home he sexually assaulted 
the victim, which included the insertion of a bamboo 
dildo in the shape of a baseball bat. The victim 
testified the assault had hurt her and that she was 
bleeding afterwards. Furthermore, a physician 
testified to finding extensive recent bruising in her 
groin area. Although the accused was acquitted of 
sexual assault causing bodily harm at trial, he was 
convicted of sexual assault with a weapon which was 
reduced on appeal to sexual assault simpliciter by the 
Quebec Court of Appeal because the accused had not 
used the dildo to kill, threaten, or intimidate as the 
French version of the Criminal Code definition of 
weapon requires. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada overturned the Court of 
Appeal’s decision and restored the decision of the trial 
judge. In its reasoning, the Court found the English 
text of the definition of “weapon” resolves any 
ambiguity arising from the French text and includes an 
object “used…in causing…injury”. Weapon is defined in 
s.2 of the Code as follows: 
 
“weapon” means any thing used, designed to be used or 
intended for use 
(a) in causing death or injury to any person, or 
(b) for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person 
and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, 
includes a firearm. 
 
“Injury” as is used in the definition of “weapon” is not 
synonymous with the term “bodily harm” as defined in 
s.2 as “any hurt or injury to a person that interferes 
with the health or comfort of the person and that is 
more than merely transient or trifling in nature”. In 
other words, injury for the purpose of determining 
whether an object is a weapon does not need to amount 
to the severity of “bodily harm”. Even though the 
injuries of the victim in this case were not sufficient 
to amount to “bodily harm”, an accused who is acquitted 
of sexual assault causing bodily harm can nonetheless 
be convicted of sexual assault with a weapon. Arbour 
J., for the unanimous Supreme Court wrote: 
 
Without providing an exhaustive definition of "injury" or a 
catalogue of distinctions between "injury" and "bodily 
harm", it is sufficient to say here that there was evidence 
of injury. The complainant testified that the assault was 
hurting her, and the doctor who examined the complainant 
testified to finding extensive recent bruising in her groin 
area. She bled sufficiently that traces of blood were left 
on the [accused’s] sofa. The [accused], who is now 
admittedly guilty of sexual assault, cannot exonerate 
himself from having caused the injury by claiming that the 
bleeding may have been triggered by a pre-existing 
medical condition of the victim. In the same way, it is not 
open to him to claim, in the circumstances of this case, 
that the injuries to the complainant may not be 
attributable to the insertion of the object in her vagina 
against her will, but may have resulted from the part of 
the assault in which no object was used. In my view, a 
proper application of the criminal causation rules allowed 
the trial judge to conclude that the complainant was 
injured by the sexual assault committed on her by the 
[accused], and that the use of the object was sufficiently 
linked to the injuries to allow the conclusion that the 
object used in committing the assault was a weapon as 
defined in s. 2. This reasoning applies equally to physical 
and psychological injuries. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca. 
 
FAILURE TO BRING SUSPECT 
FORTHWITH TO COURT W/I 24 
HOURS NOT ARBITRARY: NO 
CHARTER BREACH 
R. v. Tate, 2002 BCCA 189 
 
The accused appealed his conviction 
for the first-degree murder of his 
wife. Among other grounds, the 
accused argued that he was 
arbitrarily detained contrary to the 
Charter because the police failed to bring him before a 
justice of the peace in a timely manner as required by 
s.503 of the Criminal Code and his statements to police 
should be excluded. The accused was arrested at his 
residence at 11:30 am and not taken before the court 
until 26 ½ hours later (2:00 pm the following day). 
During the intervening period the following activities 
occurred: 
 
• After his arrest, the accused was transported to 
the hospital because he had taken a quantity of 
sleeping pills. At 11:50 am while enroute to the 
hospital, the accused acknowledged he put a 
“pickaxe” to his wife’s head; 
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 • He spent approximately 7 hours in the hospital 
(from 12:00 pm-7:00 pm) where he admitted to 
being ashamed of what he had done; 
• He spent 13 hours in police cells (from 7:00 pm-
9:00 am);  
• Between 9:20 am and 10:15 am the accused was 
interviewed. This was recorded on videotape. 
• At 11:20 am the accused was taken to court. 
However, the officer suggested, and the accused 
agreed to, doing a “re-enactment”. This was done 
between 11:20 am and 12:00 pm.  
• The accused arrived at the courthouse at 12:15 pm 
but remained in custody until his court appearance 
at 2:00 pm. During this time, the police spoke to 
Crown Counsel and swore the information. 
 
In admitting all the statements made to the police, the 
trial judge found that although the police failed to 
comply with s.503(1)(a) of the Code, the accused was 
neither arbitrarily detained nor suffered any breaches 
of his s.7, 9, or 11 Charter rights. The failure of the 
police to deliver the accused earlier to court “was the 
result of a combination of factors including a shortage 
of personnel to handle what is, for this small police 
force [the Central Saanich Police Department], a major 
investigation”.  
 
On appeal by the accused to the BCCA, Hall J.A. for 
the unanimous court held the trial judge did not err in 
his conclusion. Furthermore, the appeal court noted: 
 
…there was no causal connection between the failure to 
take  the [accused] to court earlier on the 25th and his 
willingness to give the statements he did on that date. 
The circumstances of the taking of all the statements 
are fully disclosed in the evidence and there was nothing 
unreasonable, oppressive or improper in the conduct of 
the police on either January 24 or 25, 2000, in their 
dealings with the [accused]. I would not accede to the 
argument advanced by the [accused] concerning the 
conduct of the police after his arrest. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“There is no recognized principle in Canadian law that 
the end justifies the means55”. BCProv.Crt. Judge 
Alexander. 
                                                 
55 R. v.Luu & Chan 2002 BCPC 0067. 
INTENT SURROUNDING 
ARREST LINKED TO THAT OF 
ACCUSED, NOT THE OFFICER  
R. v. Jackson,  
(2002) Docket:C32921,C28624 (OntCA) 
 
A uniformed police officer attempted 
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April 2002 to stop the accused under Ontario’s 
Highway Traffic Act for riding a 
bicycle double on the sidewalk. The 
accused did not comply with the 
officer’s request and began to jog away. As the officer 
pursued, the accused turned and fired a shot in the 
officer’s direction from a .357 Magnum revolver while 
there were five other people in the area including two 
children. The accused stopped running and fired a 
second shot while the officer took cover behind a 
parked car. The accused fled to a nearby apartment 
building and hid the revolver, which was later 
recovered. The accused was convicted by a jury of 
several weapons offences including discharging a 
firearm with intent to endanger life and intent to 
prevent an arrest. Section 244 of the Criminal Code 
reads: 
 
s. 244 Criminal Code 
Every person who, with intent 
(a) to wound, maim or disfigure any person, 
(b) to endanger the life of any person, or 
(c) to prevent the arrest or detention of any person 
discharges a firearm at any person, whether or not that 
person is the person mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) is 
guilty of an indictable offence… 
 
The accused appealed these convictions as well as the 
respective concurrent sentences of 7 and 5 years, 
excluding the 14 months spent in pre-trial custody.  
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Among several arguments, the accused submitted that 
the element of arrest in s.244(c) relates to the actus 
reus of the offence and not the mens rea. Although the 
accused testified he discharged the revolver to avoid 
arrest, the police officer testified he had no intention 
to arrest the accused. Irrespective of the accused’s 
intent, the accused argued that the offence had not 
been made out because the officer neither had the 
intention to arrest nor began to effect one. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal rejected this ground of appeal 
and found the element of arrest in s.244 is “linked” to 
the intent, or mens rea, of the accused and there is “no 
valid reason to require proof of an actual arrest, 
 whether in progress or intended, as part of the actus 
reus of this offence”. In other words, what was in the 
mind of the accused concerning arrest is relevant and 
not necessarily the intent of the police. 
 
On his sentence appeal, the accused contended the 
trial judge erred in giving the police officer an 
opportunity to address the Court without complying 
with the victim impact statement procedures found in 
s.722 of the Criminal Code. By complaining of the rules, 
regulations, and bureaucratic red tape tying the hands 
of the police, and that it was his opinion that the 
accused set the officer up to shoot him, the officer’s 
statement “exceeded the limits” of a proper victim 
impact statement. These comments went beyond the 
statements of “the harm done to, or loss suffered by, 
the victim” permissible under the victim impact 
provisions.  Because of this error, the Appeal Court was 
open to review the sentence imposed. 
 
After considering the grade 12, 20 year old accused’s 
previous record (one prior conviction of assault) and 
letters submitted by his teachers on the one hand, and 
the serious threat to public safety of firearms 
possession and the use of a firearm against a police 
officer on the other, the Court reduced the total 
sentence to 4 years and 8 months.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
 
JIBC’s ANNUAL BUY A BOOK 
CAMPAIGN 
 
 
 
The Justice Institute is 
honoured to recognize 
William Deverell, award 
winning crime writer, 
lawyer, and former 
journalist as the first 
Honourary Campaign 
Chair of the Justice 
Institute's Annual Buy a 
Book Campaign taking 
place throughout the month of April. Deverell's most 
recent novel, The Laughing Falcon, was published in 
September 2001. 
 
The Buy A Book Campaign is an initiative by the 
fundraising arm of the Justice Institute, the JI 
Foundation, in support of the JI Library. 
 
The JI Library serves 40,000 users around the 
province including students and professionals who work 
in the areas of municipal policing, firefighting, 
emergency medicine, corrections and community 
justice, social services, courts, emergency management, 
and conflict resolution. 
 
"The campaign enables us to maintain our diverse 
collection and provide the information our clients 
need," says Institute Librarian April Haddad. 
 
Financial contributions to the library translate into an 
ability to purchase the most current and relevant 
information for professionals working in the fields of 
public safety, social services and conflict resolution - 
the people who keep BC's communities safe. 
 
The Justice Institute of BC is a dynamic, post-
secondary learning organization with a unique provincial 
mandate that encompasses education and training for 
all aspects of public safety that lead to safer 
communities. Locally and globally, the JI model brings 
together police, fire, paramedic, courts, corrections, 
emergency management, traffic education, conflict 
resolution, and social services. Each year, the JI’s 
distinctive educational co-op model attracts more than 
20,000 students with 27% of the curriculum delivered 
via distance learning and referred to as the “Virtual” 
JI.  
 
For further information or to make a donation contact: 
 
Francine Gaudet or Karen Wanders 
JI Foundation  
Justice Institute of B.C. 
(604) 528-5582 or 528-5874 
 
INMATE SUES FOR LOST 
SLEEP: MOTION TO DISMISS 
REJECTED 
Wild v. Correctional Services of Canada, 
2002 FCT 219 
 
A Federal Court judge dismissed an 
p
n
w
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April 2002 application by the defendant 
Correctional Services of Canada 
(Mission Medium Institution) 
seeking an order striking the 
laintiff’s claim. The defendant argued that there was 
o reasonable cause of action and the plaintiff’s suit 
as frivolous or vexatious. The plaintiff is suing the 
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 Correctional Services of Canada for awakening him 
unnecessarily during regular inmate counts causing him 
to lose 509 full nights of sleep, 312 of which were 
when the plaintiff was in REM sleep. Furthermore, he 
contends he was not treated humanely, his dignity was 
undermined, and his current or future health was 
jeopardized. The accused seeks damages for emotional 
stress and physical and neurological damage. Hugessen 
J. dismissed the defendant’s motion finding there is 
“absolutely nothing” to support the claim that the 
action is frivolous or vexatious. The lawsuit will 
proceed. 
 
Complete case available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca 
 
ATTEMPT MURDER OF  
POLICE OFFICER CONVICTION 
UPHELD 
R. v. McCallum, 2002 BCCA 198 
 
The accused (driver) and another 
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person has a common intention with another person to 
commit a primary offence. Since the offence was 
attempted murder, the Crown must prove that the 
accused had knowledge that the passenger would do 
something with the intent to kill in carrying out the 
common purpose (robbery). The accused argued that 
the passenger never attempted to shoot the 
motorcycle officer when he rounded the blind corner 
and simply pointing a firearm under these 
circumstances does not lead to a common intention to 
kill. The submission of the accused was that the 
passenger aimed the gun at the motorcycle officer to 
dissuade him from pursuing, not to kill him. 
 
The trial judge held that the intent to kill was formed 
by the passenger before the motorcycle officer 
rounded the corner and continued until the evasive 
action of the officer made it “impractical and 
unnecessary” to carry out the intention to murder. In 
defining the robbery as “well-planned” involving a fake 
RCMP uniform, masks, false licence plates and 
numerous firearms, the trial judge found both the 
accused driver and the passenger were assisting each 
V
Amale (passenger) drove to a bank in 
Victoria. The passenger entered the 
bank dressed in a RCMP uniform, 
demanded money while armed with a 
hot gun, and left the bank and entered into a vehicle 
riven by the accused. The suspect vehicle sped away 
ut was observed by police (one officer in a police car 
nd another on a motorcycle) who began to pursue it. 
he vehicle stopped at one point and a shot was fired 
n the direction of the pursuing officers. The vehicle 
ook off again with police in pursuit and a second shot 
as subsequently fired from the moving vehicle.  
he motorcycle officer continued the pursuit during 
hich he was shot at a further five times. As this 
fficer came around a blind corner, he found the 
ehicle stopped, the passenger door open, and the 
assenger facing him with a gun at his shoulder pointed 
irectly at the officer. The officer took an evasive 
aneuver to avoid gunfire.  The vehicle fled again and 
fficer was able to continue the chase and later locate 
he vehicle stopped in a driveway. The passenger 
merged from the vehicle and fired his weapon in the 
irection of a police officer who arrived at the scene. 
he accused and the passenger fled on foot but were 
ater apprehended.  
he accused, who was the driver of the get away 
ehicle, appealed his attempted murder conviction. 
ection 21(2) of the Criminal Code creates criminal 
ulpability for collateral offences committed where a 
other in carrying out the common purpose of 
committing the robbery and both were assisting each 
other in escaping from police. Moreover, the only 
reason the accused stopped the vehicle on the blind 
corner was to allow the passenger to exit the vehicle to 
get a clear shot at the pursuing officer; the previous 
attempts at eliminating this officer had been 
unsuccessful. In dismissing the accused’s conviction 
appeal, the unanimous BCCA found the trial judge drew 
a reasonable inference from the evidence of the 
accused’s knowledge of the passenger’s intention to 
murder and that the accused participated in this 
attempt.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
CHARTER TURNS TWENTY 
 
On April 17, 2002 the 
Canadian Charter of 
olume 2 Issue 4 
pril 2002 Rights and Freedoms 
celebrates its 20th 
Anniversary. For the 
police, the Charter is like 
a living tree, continually 
growing to find a just and 
proper balance between 
the competing interests of individual rights and the 
needs of law enforcement to effectively protect 
society.  
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 ‘INSIGNIFICANT, 
INACCURATE, & OVERSTATED’ 
OBSERVATIONS FATAL TO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
R. v. Luu & Chan, 2002 BCPC 0067 
 
Several police officers executed a 
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strong odour of marihuana may be sufficient to justify 
a search warrant, the trial judge found the officer was 
not in a position to properly isolate the odour to the 
accused’s residence. The officer’s conclusion that the 
odour could only emanate from the accused’s residence 
was unreasonable. The trial judge also found the 
officer “ill prepared to testify” and made “the 
impression that he had not even taken the time to 
glance at his notes before giving evidence”. There were 
V
Asearch warrant at a residential 
premise and found both accused and 
a 236 marihuana plant grow 
peration inside. The accused challenged the validity of 
he search warrant and a voire dire was declared to 
etermine if there was a breach of s.8 of the Charter. 
he information to obtain (ITO) the search warrant 
tated: 
On the 4th of December, 2000, information was received 
by the Burnaby RCMP from an anonymous tip that the 
residence located at 8496 16th Avenue has a marihuana 
grow operation located in the basement. On January 11th, 
2001, the peace officer attended and confirmed that 
8496 16th Avenue, Burnaby, British Columbia, did in fact 
exist. The peace officer made note that the lower 
windows in the basement were blacked out with no light 
showing through the blinds; this observation made by the 
police officer on five previous attendances to this 
address. The police officer also smelled a strong odour of 
growing marihuana directly in front of the house at 8496 
16th Avenue, Burnaby, British Columbia. The police 
officer determined that the given location of the house 
on the corner and, with the given direction of the wind, 
that the odour of growing marihuana could only be coming 
from that residence. The police officer has experience 
with 25 marihuana grow operations. The anonymous tip of 
the home containing a marihuana grow, the darkened 
windows in the basement, and the detection of odour of 
growing marihuana coming from the home, are all 
consistent with a home that is currently growing 
marihuana. The police officer verily believes that the 
information contained herein to be true and correct. 
t trial, the officer was called as a witness and 
rovided further testimony as to his observations; 
uch of this information was not included in the ITO. 
he trial judge found the officer did not disclose a 
umber of material facts, including “physical 
ifficulties in observing the property due to its 
ocation and lack of lane access, the existence of 
nother home immediately backing the subject 
esidence, and the consequent potential difficulties in 
solating any odour”. Furthermore, the officer did not 
isclose he did not detect any odour of marihuana on 
our prior attendances at the property. Although a 
inconsistencies in his evidence and the judge found the 
officer to be unreliable. 
 
After assessing the information and excising several of 
the observations made by the officer from the ITO, 
what remained could not properly support the issuance 
of the search warrant. In excluding the evidence under 
s.24(2) of the Charter, the trial judge stated, at para. 
28: 
 
In considering the seriousness of the breach, I take into 
account the relatively insignificant, inaccurate and 
overstated observations of the peace officer in support 
of the application for the search warrant. The resulting 
breach was beyond technical or inadvertent. It was a 
deliberate entry into a personal residence on the spurious 
grounds. Though I am unable to conclude on the evidence 
before me that the peace officer acted in bad faith, his 
actions are consistent with an attempted shortcut to a 
more through investigation.  
 
And further at para. 30: 
 
[T]he search was not undertaken on reasonable and 
probable grounds, but on the barest suspicion initiated by 
a tip of unknown reliability. Further investigation may 
have yielded more concrete grounds for the peace 
officer’s suspicions, and hence a proper basis for a 
warrant. However, the evidence as presented falls short 
of that threshold. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
WE WANT TO MAKE YOUR 
EXPERIENCE A POLICE 
ACADEMY SCENARIO 
 
Have you had an 
experience that you want 
to share involving a police 
tactic that went right, or 
wrong?  If so, we are 
interested in hearing 
from you.   
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We want to expose police recruits to your real life 
experiences so that we can address officer safety 
issues or to reinforce good, solid police tactical 
training, before they hit the streets. 
 
So, please e-mail us your experiences to Sgt. Frank 
Querido fquerido@jibc.bc.ca or Sgt. Tammy 
Schellenberg at tschellenberg@jibc.bc.ca. 
 
If we use your scenario, during our simulations, we will 
send you a JIBC Police Academy “Sharing the Moment” 
t-shirt.  Be safe out there!!! 
 
IN MEMORIAL 
 
Last month, Canadian police 
lost two officers in the line 
of duty. This brings the total 
number of officers killed this 
year to five. Our hearts and 
prayers go out to the family 
members of our fallen 
colleagues. Their bravery and 
courage will not be forgotten and the circumstances 
surrounding their deaths are a reminder to the dangers 
police officers face as they protect and serve us all. 
 
On March 29, 2002, 29-year-old British Columbia 
RCMP Constable Wael Toufic Audi lost his life in an 
automobile accident. He made an abrupt U-turn at 
about 3 p.m. near Brackendale, BC. A tour 
bus, unable to slow down, sliced open his 
unmarked car. Doctors who happened on 
the scene tried to save Constable Audi, 
but he died from massive injuries.  
Constable Audi was the liaison officer for 
Elementary School, and often visited the sch
with sports and an anti-drug program. Const
was a five-year veteran of the RCMP. 
 
On March 12, 2002, 35-year-old Alber
Constable Christine Diotte was struck and k
vehicle while she and her partner invest
accident on the Trans-Canada Highway 
near Banff, Alberta. After the two 
constables exited their patrol car an SUV 
lost control on the icy road and struck 
both of them, causing fatal injuries to 
Constable Diotte. Her partner was transpo
local hospital in stable condition. Constable D
been with the agency for eight years and wa
by her husband.  
 
On February 28, 2002, 29-year-old Montreal Police 
Officer Constable Benoit L'Ecuyer was shot and killed 
following a chase with a stolen car. He died in hospital a 
few hours after the shooting in the city's 
north end. Police said the shooting 
occurred after a brief chase involving a 
police van and a stolen car. Following a 
collision between the two vehicles, three 
suspects got out of the vehicle and a foot chase 
ensued. The officer, a seven-year police veteran, was 
shot several times in the chest and was wearing a 
bullet proof vest. His partner, who was not hit, tried to 
return the fire. Constable L'Ecuyer is survived by his 
wife and two children.  
 
On February 18, 2002, 31-year-old Toronto Police 
Officer Constable Laura Ellis and her partner, 
Constable Ronald Tait, were responding in their scout 
car to an emergency call when their 
vehicle collided with another car. The 
crash occurred on Brimley Road at 
Huntingwood Drive in Toronto and 
Constable Ellis was pronounced dead at 
the scene. Constable Tait received serious, but non life 
threatening injuries. The driver and lone occupant of 
the private car was also taken to hospital with non life 
threatening injuries. Constable Ellis is the first female 
police officer killed on duty in Toronto. She joined the 
force in December, 1996 as an officer in training and 
was appointed constable in June, 1997. She is survived 
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On January 18, 2002, 37-year-old Park
Warden Michael Wynn was stationed at th
Icefields warden station in Alberta. Part of
included forecasting avalanche 
conditions. Warden Wynn and 
two other Jasper wardens, 
Randy Fingland and Brad Romaniuk, were 
avalanche risk assessments at the ridge when
slide engulfed them. Fingland, also an auxilia
of the Jasper RCMP, suffered only minor inju
leg, while Romaniuk escaped unharmed. Wynn
to Banff Mineral Springs hospital, and late
Foothills Hospital where he succumbed to h
He is survived by his wife and 2-year-old son
 
The above information provided with per
Officer Down Memorial Page avai
www.odmp.org/ canada. 
For comments on this newsletter contac
Sgt. Mike Novakowski at the JIBC Police Academ
528-5733 or e-mail at mnovakowski@jibc.b
Past issues available online at www.jibc.bc 
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